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21- INTRODUCTION
We consider markets where a finite number of sellers and buyers meet, with the
particularity that each seller only owns one object and each buyer only wants to buy, at
most, one object. These markets are usually referred to as the assignment game, which
was introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972). Buyers are heterogeneous in their
preferences about the different objects. Associated with each possible partnership there
is a non-negative real number that represents the worth of the partnership. An outcome
of this game specifies a matching between buyers and sellers and the price that each
buyer pays to the owner of the object she is buying.
The solution concept usually considered to analyze these markets is stability. An
outcome is stable if it is individually rational and there is no partnership and a price so
that, at this price, both buyer and seller are better off under this partnership than under
the previous outcome. Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that the set of stable allocations
is non-empty and it is a complete distributive lattice. This set contains a special
allocation giving an optimal payoff to the buyers (which is the worse for the sellers) and
another one giving an optimal payoff to the sellers (the worst for the buyers).
Moreover, the set of stable allocations coincides with the set of competitive equilibria,
the two extreme allocations corresponding to the minimum and to the maximum
equilibrium prices, respectively.
The assignment game allows for the analysis of markets with a finite number of
heterogeneous sellers and buyers. The participants in these markets typically take
decisions strategically. Each seller determines the price for his object looking for the
maximum revenue, taking into account the prices posted by the other sellers. Similarly,
each buyer tries to buy the best available object, given the prices. A natural question is
then whether the non-cooperative (strategic) behavior by sellers and buyers actually
leads to outcomes that are stable, or competitive.
We analyze the following mechanism, which tries to capture the relevant interaction
among sellers and buyers: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers,
sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first
3phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines
the actual matching. The mechanism is very simple in terms of strategies: each seller
only proposes a price for his object, each buyer only chooses an object. Also, the
decisions by the buyers directly provide a matching, the decisions by the sellers are the
final prices for the objects sold, and there is no need for a referee.
We look for the subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies (SPE) of the previous
mechanism. We restrict attention to a certain class of strategies of the buyers, that we
call maximal strategies (the matchings induced by these strategies are called maximal
matchings). To explain the meaning of a maximal strategy, consider a situation with two
buyers, Alph and Bob, and two objects. Suppose that the prices have already been set
and that Alph is indifferent between the two objects. However, if she chooses the first
object then Bob obtains a high utility by buying the second one, while if Alph chooses
the second object then Bob does not want to buy the other. We say that Alph buying
the first object (and Bob the second) is a maximal strategy, while Alph buying the
second object (and Bob not buying) is not. Notice that both strategies are SPE of the
game that starts once the prices have been decided. A matching is maximal if it is Pareto
efficient for the buyers among the matchings that result as SPE of the second phase of
the mechanism.
We also concentrate on the analysis of the SPE in the strong sense (see Dema g
and Gale (1985)). To be equilibrium in the strong sense, the strategies of the
participants must be robust to deviations by any optimistic seller. More precisely, we
assume that a seller increases his price whenever there is a maximal matching for the
buyers where his object is actually sold.
We prove that, when buyers use maximal strategies, the set of SPE in the strong
sense of the proposed mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable
outcomes. That is, strategic behavior by sellers and buyers in the assignment game leads
to (the maximum) equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching for a mechanism that,
we think, captures the main ingredients of the interaction among sellers and buyers in
many markets.
4The implementation result conveys interesting information about the properties of
the outcome of the mechanism. The first property is that the set of SPE in the strong
sense, when buyers use maximal strategies, does not depend on the order of the buyers,
that is, the order of the line does not matter in equilibrium. The second property is that,
in equilibrium, every buyer is buying an object that is optimal for her given the prices. In
equilibrium, every buyer obtains an object in her demand set and each seller willing to
sell can do so. Moreover, no seller has an incentive to choose a different price.
In this paper, we follow the line of research initiated by Gale and Shapley (1962) in
their seminal paper. They introduce the deferred acceptance algorithm for the marriage
problem. In this mechanism, each man1 proposes to his favorite woman, if she is
acceptable to him. Each woman accepts the most preferred man among the offers she
receives, if he is acceptable to her. Accepted men remain provisionally engaged, while
rejected men can make new proposals to their next choice. The algorithm stops at the
first step in which no man is rejected.
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that when participants declare heir true preferences
the matching produced by this simple and nice algorithm is an allocation that all men
prefer to any other stable allocation.2 Even when the participants can act strategically,
the outcome is still nice: truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy for
men (Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982)) and the equilibrium of the game
where the men state their true preferences and women can choose any preference is still
an stable allocation (Roth, 1984). Moreover, Gale and Sotomayor (1985) show that the
women's optimal stable allocation is the strong equilibrium of the game, when men play
their dominant strategy.
Besides the analysis of the deferred acceptance algorithm, several authors have
looked for other simple mechanisms that lead to stable allocations for different matching
models. For the marriage problem, Alcalde (1996) presents a mechanism, close to that
                                         
1 The mechanism can also be implemented exchanging the roles of men and women.
5of Gale and Shapley, which implements the correspondence of stable matchings in
undominated equilibria. Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998), and
Alcalde and Romero-Medina (1999) implement through simple mechanisms the set of
stable matchings in the college-admissions problem and in the job matching market,
respectively. Moreover, they also implement particular subsets of the stable
correspondence.3
For the assignment game, Demange and Gale (1985) analyze the properties of a
mechanism in which agents announce their demand and supply functions, and then a
referee calculates the minimum equilibrium price and allocates the objects accordingly.
However, the mechanism is manipulable for the sellers: they can lead the payoff to the
maximum rather than the minimum equilibrium price by falsifying their supply functions.
In the same framework, Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) propose two dynamic
auction mechanisms, although they do not analyze the possibility of manipulative
behavior.
Also for the assignment game, Kamecke (1989) analyzes the strategic interaction
between buyers and sellers in a mechanism that shares common features to ours. He
considers the following game: First, sellers announce their payoff claims. Then one
buyer after the other addresses her demand and chooses a seller. Finally, sellers select
again one of their potential customers. For matched couples, the agents get what they
asked for if their two claims are feasible. Also, the payoff function assigns to a seller the
payoff that was offered to him if it exceeds his claim. Additionally, agents pay a positive
cost if they address demands without being successful. This mechanism implements in
SPE the seller-optimal stable payoff.4 The nice feature of Kamecke's result is that it
                                                                                                               
2 In the same spirit, Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduce a salary-
adjustment process for the job matching market.
3 For general cooperative games in characteristic form, several papers have recently addressed the
question of implementation of the core (Pérez-Castrillo (1994), Perry and Re y (1994), Serrano
(1995)).
4 Kamecke (1989) also analyzes a mechanism similar to the one we have presented but in which
demands by sellers and claims and choice of opponent by buyers are all made simultaneously at the
first period. He shows that this mechanism implements in SPE the set of stable allocations.
6does not need additional considerations concerning sellers' and buyers' strategies.
However, the mechanism that we propose is simpler, closer to the functioning of the
markets, and it does not need some (third) party to allocate the surplus of a partnership,
if any, and to enforce the payment of unsuccessful demands. Note that both mechanisms
share the interesting property that they provide a strong first mover advantage: the fact
that sellers fix their prices first makes it that, at equilibrium, the final prices are the
highest among the competitive prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the cooperative model of
the assignment game. In Section 3, we describe the mechanism proposed. In Section 4,
we analyze the set of equilibria in the strong sense when buyers use maximal strategies
and we state the main results. In Section 5 we discuss the use of maximal strategies,
while in Section 6, we present some examples of possible outcomes of the mechanism
when we do not restrict attention to maximal strategies or to equilibria in the strong
sense. In Section 7, we conclude. Finally, an Appendix contains some of the proofs.
2- THE COOPERATIVE MODEL
We consider a buyer-seller market in which each seller owns only one indivisible
object and each buyer wants at most one of those objects. G neric buyers will be
denoted by pi and pk and generic sellers by qj and qh. The object owned by seller qj will
also be denoted by qj. Let P = {p1,..., pm} be the set of buyers and Q = {q0, q1,..., qn-1}
be the set of objects, where q0 is an artificial "null object" that is introduced for technical
convenience. More than one buyer may buy the object q0. This convention allows us to
treat a buyer pi that does not buy any object as if she bought the null object q0.
For each pair (pi, qj)ÎPxQ there is a non-negative number aij which can be
interpreted as the maximum price that buyer pi is willing to pay for the object qj. We
will denote by a the mxn matrix (aij)i=1,...,m;j=0,1,...,n-1. The value ai0 is zero to all buyers.
For simplicity, we assume that the reservation price of each seller is zero and that there
are no monetary transfers among agents from the same side. Thus, if buyer pi buy  the
object qj at a price vj then the resulting utilities are ui = aij-vj for the buyer and vj for the
7seller. The price of the object q0 is always zero, v0 = 0, hence if buyer pi buys q0 she
obtains a utility ui = ai0-v0 = 0. The buyer-seller market is denoted by M º (P, Q, a).
Definition 1- A feasible matching m for M is a function from PÈQ-{q0} onto PÈQ
such that:
(a) for any piÎP, m(pi)ÎQ;
(b) for any qjÎQ-{q0}, either m(qj)ÎP or m(qj) = qj;
(c) for any (pi, qj)ÎPxQ-{q0}, m(pi) = qj if and only if m(qj) = pi.
If m(pi) = q0, the buyer pi will also be called unmatched. If m(qj) = qj, the seller qj will
be called unmatched (or the object qj will be called unsold). Given a set AÍP, we
denote m(A) º {m(pi); piÎA}.
Definition 2- A feasible matching m  isoptimal for M if for all feasible matching m':
a
ij
p i ÎP
q j =m ( pi )
å ³ aij
pi ÎP
q j = m' ( p i )
å
We denote by Rn+ the set of vectors in Rn with non-negative coordinates.
Definition 3- A feasible outcome for M, denoted by (u, v; m), is a pair of vectors uÎRm+
and vÎRn+ and a feasible matching m such that, for all (pi, qj)ÎPxQ, ui+vj = aij if m(pi) =
qj.
Thus a feasible outcome may have unsold objects with price greater than zero. If (u,
v; m) is a feasible outcome then (u, v) is called a feasible payoff. The matching m is said
to be compatible with (u, v) or with the prices v and vice-versa. The vector u will be
called the payoff vector of the buyers associated to (v, m).
Definition 4- Given the prices vÎRn+ and a matching m, compatible with v, we say that
an object qj is m-expensive under vif it is unsold under m, at a price vj > 0.
8Definition 5- A feasible outcome (u, v; m) is stable (or the payoff (u, v) with the
matching m is stable) if ui+vj ³ aij for all (pi, qj)ÎPxQ and there is no m-expensive object
under v.
If ui+vj < aij for some pair (pi, qj) we say that (pi, qj) blocks the outcome (u, v; m) or
the payoff (u, v).
In the matching models treated here, the concept of stability is equivalent to the
concept of the core. Moreover, it is possible to establish a relationship between stable
outcomes and competitive equilibria of these markets.
Given vÎRn+, the demand set of a buyer pi at prices v, denoted by Di(v), is the set of
all objects which maximize pi's utility payoffs. That is:
                  Di(v) = {qjÎQ ; aij-vj  ³ aih-vh for all qh in Q}.
The set Di(v) is always non-empty, since buyer pi has always the option of buying q0.
Also notice that, given , buyer pi is indifferent about buying any object in Di(v).
Definition 6- The price vector vÎRn+ is called competitive if there exists a matching m
such that m(pi)ÎDi(v), for all pi in P. A matching m such that m(pi)ÎDi(v) for all pi in P
is said to be competitive for the prices v.
Therefore, at competitive pric s v, each buyer can be matched to an object in her
demand set. There may be more than one competitive matching for the same price
vector v.
Definition 7- The pair (v, m) is a competitive equilibrium f v is competitive, m is
competitive for v, and if vj = 0 for any unsold object qj.
Thus, at a competitive equilibrium (v, m), not only does every buyer get an object in
her demand set, but there is no m-expensive object under v. If (v, m) is a competitive
equilibrium, v will be called an equilibrium price vector. Clearly, to each competitive
9equilibrium (v, m) we can associate a stable outcome (u, v; ) and vice-versa, by setting
ui = aij-vj if m(pi) = qj, and ui = 0 if m(pi) = q0.
Among the set of stable outcomes, two particularly interesting outcomes can be
highlighted.
Definition 8- The payoff (u, v ) is called the s ller-optimal stable payoff if v  ³ v and u
£ u for all stable payoffs (u, v).
If m is compatible with (u, v ) we say that the outcome (u, v ; m) is the seller-optimal
stable outcome with the matching m. S milarly we can define the buy r-optimal stable
payoff.
The following well-known results from Shapley and Shubik (1972) will be stated
here without proof.5
Proposition 1- Every buyer-seller market M has at least one stable outcome.
Consequently, the core and the set of competitive equilibria are non-empty sets.
Proposition 2- If m is an optimal matching, then it is compatible with any stable payoff.
Thus, if m is an optimal matching, then it is competitive for any competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 3- If (u, v; m) is a stable outcome, then m is an optimal matching.
Consequently if (v, m) is a competitive equilibrium then m is an optimal matching.
Moreover, according to Propositions 2 and 3, the set of stable outcomes is the
Cartesian product of the set of stable payoffs and the set of optimal matchings.
Proposition 4- Every buyer-seller market M has a seller-optimal stable payoff and a
buyer-optimal stable payoff.
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The existence of a seller-optimal stable payoff is equivalent to the statement that
there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices, v , that is optimal for the sellers, in the
sense that v j ³ vj for all qj in Q and for all equilibrium price vector . Similar statement
applies to the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The equilibrium price vector v  is called the
maximum equilibrium price vector and a competitive equilibrium (v ; ) is called a
maximum competitive equilibrium.
3- THE BUYER-SELLER SEQUENTIAL MECHANISM
Our main purpose in this paper is to analyze the outcome of a simple selling and
buying procedure that will be denoted by Hs. We attempt to propose a mechanism as
simple as possible, at the same time have it produce directly both a matching between
sellers and buyers and prices for the objects sold. It is a two-phase mechanism. In the
first phase, each seller proposes a tentative price for his object. Proposals are made
simultaneously. In the second phase buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if
any. The tentative prices of sold objects become actual prices paid by buyers to sellers,
while sellers of unsold objects keep their objects and receive nothing.
Formally, let s be a permutation of the set of buyers (i.e., s repr sents a line). The
mechanism Hs works as follows:
(i) First, sellers play simultaneously. A strategy for seller qj consists of choosing a price
vjÎR+ for his object. We consider that the null object q0 is always available at the price
v0 = 0.
(ii) Second, buyers play sequentially, following the order given by s. To describe the
buyers' strategies, denote by Qi the set of all objects which are still available for pi wh n
she is called to play under the ordering s (notice that q0ÎQi). A strategy for buyer pi is
a function that selects an element of Qi, for each vector of offers v.
                                                                                                               
5 See also Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an exposition of these results.
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Following the mechanisms, it is not possible for two different buyers to select the
same object, unless the object is q0. Then, the joint strategies for the buyers, one for
each of them, produces a feasible matching , where m(pi) is the object of Qi chosen by
pi. Any non-selected object will be unmatched under m. The mechanism allocates the
objects according to the matching m. Also, every buyer pi pays vj to seller qj if m(pi) = qj;
hence seller qj receives vj if qj is sold and receives nothing if qj is unsold. That is, Hs(v,
m) = (v*, m), where v* is the vector of prices actually paid in the market, which
constitutes the payoff vector of the sellers: v*j = vj if m(qj)ÎP and v*j = 0 if qj is unsold.
Sometimes we will use the notation Hsj(v,m) for seller qj’s payoff, v*j. Moreover, the
payoff of buyer pi is then ui = aij-v*j = aij-vj when m(pi) = qj. Clearly, ui = 0 if m(pi) =
q0.
Given some permutation s, we are going to consider the subgame perfect equilibria
in pure strategies (s-SPE) of the game induced by the mechanism Hs. The set of best
responses for the buyers to the sellers' joint strategies, say v, is the et of SPE of the
game that starts once v has been decided. (Notice that the elements of this set are
matchings). For these equilibria, it is always the case that each buyer chooses, once the
prices v have been selected, one among the best objects available for her (this includes
the possibility of her selecting the null object). In other words, each buyer pi chooses an
object in Di(v½Qi), which is the set of objects in Qi that maximize pi's utility payoff.
That is,
               Di(v½Qi) º {qjÎQi ; aij-vj ³ aih-vh, for all qh in Qi}.
A matching m obtained in this way is called s-competitive for the prices v. Formally:
Definition 9 - Given the permutation s a d the feasible price vector v, the matching m
is s-competitive for v if every buyer pi chooses m(pi)ÎDi(v½Qi).
Therefore, m is s-competitive for v if each buyer pi chooses one among her best
responses to v and to the actions of the previous buyers. For some price vectors, there
are several s-competitive matchings. This happens when a buyer must select one out of
12
a set of several objects among which she is completely indifferent. Even if her action
does not change her final utility, it strongly influences the utilities of the sellers coming
after her. To illustrate this situation, consider the following example:
Example 1- Consider a set of objects Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3} and a set of buyers P = {p1,
p2, p3}. Let the matrix a be such that a11 = a12 = a21 = a23 = a32 = a33 = 2 and the other
entries are zero. Let s = (p1, p2, p3). Suppose that the sellers choose the vector of prices
v = (0, 1, 1, 1) and that the buyers choose m(p1) = q2, m(p 2) = q3 and m(p 3) = q0. Each
buyer is selecting a best response given the prices of the objects and the actions of the
previous buyers. However, notice that if either p1 or p2 chooses q1 then buyer p3 can
select either q2 or q3, respectively. If this happens, buyers p1 and p2 have the same utility
payoff as before but p3 is strictly better off.
Sometimes, it is reasonable to assume that if a buyer is completely indifferent among
several actions, but one of them leads to a more efficient outcome for the buyers
coming after her, then she will choose this action. When we restrict attention to such
strategies we say that buyers are selecting s-max mal matchings. Formally we have:
Definition 10- Given the permutation s a d the price vector vÎRn+, we say that m is s-
maximal for v if m is s-competitive for v and it is Pareto-efficient for the buyers in the
set of s-competitive matchings for v. That is, let u be the payoff vector of the buyers
associated to (v,m). Then m is s-maximal for v if and only if (a) m is s-competitive for
v, and (b) for any matching m’ which is -competitive for v, if ui < u’i for some pi in P,
then uk > u’k for some pk in P, where u’ is the payoff vector of the buyers associated to
(v, m’).
We must point out that given s, if v is an equilibrium price and m is an optimal
matching then m is s-maximal for v. However, the converse is not true. In fact,
consider, for example, a market with only one object q1 and only one buyer p1. The
buyer is indifferent between buying the object at the price v = a11 or not buying it. Any
of her options is a s-maximal matching for v, but only the first one is an optimal
matching.
13
Let us now look at the possible strategic actions by the sellers. To analyze whether a
vector of prices is part of an equilibrium, we must check that no seller is interested in
deviating from his proposed price. Sometimes, a deviation by a seller is profitable or not
depending on the expected reaction by the buyers. The following example illustrates
this:
Example 2- Consider a set of objects Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3} and a set of buyers P = {p1,
p2, p3}. Let the matrix a be such that a11 = 1, a12 = a22 = a23 = 2, a33 = 1 and the other
entries are zero. Let s = (p2, p1, p3). Suppose that the sellers choose the vector of prices
v = (0, 0, 0, 0). If q1 increases his price from v1 = 0 to v'1 = 0.5, this deviation can be
profitable for q1 if p2 buys q2, for then p1 will buy q1. However, the deviation is not
profitable if p2 buys q3. In this case the best response for p1 is to buy q2 and p3 will be
unmatched. Observe that the set of best responses for the buyers has only these two
matchings and both of them are s-maximal (under the first matching the payoff vector
of the buyers is (0.5, 2, 1) and under the second one is (2, 2, 0)).
What behavior can be predicted for q1 in this game? We will assume that a seller who
analyses the possibility of deviating takes an optimistic view. That is, a seller changes
his strategy whenever he has a chance to be better off. Therefore we are looking for
seller strategies under which no seller has a chance to be better off. This means that we
are interested in equilibria in the strong version. (A similar concept has been defined by
Demange and Gale (1985).) Also, to avoid inconsistencies, we continue to require that
the buyers use s-maximal strategies. The formal definition of a s-SPE in the strong
sense is then the following:
Definition 11- Let s be some permutation, vÎRn+ a price vector and m some s-maximal
matching for v. We say that (v, m) is a s-SPE in the strong sense if for no qj there is a
v', with v'h = vh for qh ¹ qj, and a s-maximal matching m' for v', such that Hsj(v', m') >
Hsj(v, m).
Notice that by considering only the equilibria in the strong sense we restrict the set
of SPE.
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4- THE SET OF EQUILIBRIA
In this section we show that, if the buyers always choose s-maximal matchings, the
set of outcomes of the equilibria in the strong sense coincides with the set of maximum
competitive equilibria for any s. That is, first, the final prices paid by the buyers at
equilibrium correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector for the assigned
objects. Second, the assignment of objects to buyers corresponds to an optimal
matching (and every optimal matching is part of some s-SPE). The previous result
implies, in particular, that the vectors of sellers' payoff and buyers' utility are the same
under any s-SPE in the strong sense. Moreover, in equilibrium, the ordering determined
by s is irrelevant.
In this section, we will denote the s-SPE in the strong sense as s-SPE, for short.
When (v, m) is a s-SPE we will say that v is part of a s-SPE and that Hs(v, m) is the s-
SPE outcome.
To characterize the set of s-SPE outcomes of Hs, we will use Proposition 5 below,
which is an immediate consequence of Hall's theorem (see Gale (1960)). To state it, we
need the following definition:
Definition 12- Let vÎRn+, and P'ÍP be such that q0ÏDi(v) for all piÎP'. We say that D
º Èp
i
ÎP’Di(v) is an overdemanded set under v if ôDô<ôP'ô.6
That is, a set D is overdemanded if the number of buyers demanding only objects in
D is greater than the number of objects in D.
Proposition 5- (Corollary of Hall's Theorem)- Let vÎRn+. A competitive matching for
v exists if and only if there is no overdemanded set under v.
                                         
6 Given a set A, we denote its cardinality by ôAô.
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We start our analysis of the s-SPE of the mechanism Hs by stating a result that will
allow us to use Hall's theorem. Proposition 6 shows that, at a -SPE, there exists no
overdemanded set.
Proposition 6- Let v be the vector of strategies of the sellers in a s-SPE. Then, there is
no overdemanded set under v.
In the proof of Proposition 6, we will use Lemma 1, whose proof is relegated to the
Appendix. It establishes the following property. Consider a price vector which is par  of
a s-SPE, and a group of buyers that obtain a strictly positive payoff and that buy
objects in their demand sets. Then, there is some object which is not bought by any of
the buyers in this group but which belongs to some of their demand sets.
Lemma 1- Let v be the vector of strategies of the sellers in a s-SPE. Let m be some s-
maximal matching for v such that m(pi)ÎDi(v) for all piÎP'ÍP and denote by u the
payoff vector of the buyers associated with (v, m). Suppose that ui > 0 for all piÎP'ÍP.
Let Q' º m(P'). Then, there exists some piÎP' and qjÏQ' such that qjÎDi(v).
Proof of Proposition 6- Let s = (p1, p2,..., pm) and denote Pr º {p1,..., pr}. For the
proof of the proposition, it is sufficient to prove that for all 1 £ r £ m, and all P'ÍPr
with q0ÏDi(v) for every piÎP', we have that ½Èp
i
ÎP'Di(v)½³½P'½. We will prove it by
induction on r. If r = 1 it is obvious.
Suppose that for all P'ÍPr-1, with q0ÏDi(v) for every piÎP', we have that
½P'½£½Èp
i
ÎP'Di(v)½. Before proving that the property also holds for r, we show first
that there exists a s-maximal matching m' for v such that m'(pi)ÎDi(v) for all i = 1,
2,..., r-1. That is, we want to show that there is a s-maximal matching m' for M = (P,
Q, a), whose restriction to M' = (Pr-1, Q, a'), is a competitive matching for v, where a'
is the restriction of a to Pr-1xQ. Then, let
S = {m; m is s-competitive for v in M and m(pi)ÎDi(v) for all i = 1, 2,..., r-1}.
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That is, S is the set of all s-competitive matchings for v whose restriction to M' is
competitive. By the induction hypothesis there is no overdemanded set of objects in M'
under v. Proposition 5 implies that there exists some competitive matching for v in M'.
Therefore the set S is non empty, since the matching given by Proposition 5 can be
easily extended to a s-competitive matching for v (we only need to take a best response
for the buyers from pr on, which always exists). Since S is non-empty and finite, there is
at least a matching m'ÎS which is Pareto-efficient for the buyers among all matchings in
S. We claim that m' is a s-maximal matching for v. That is, m' is Pareto-efficient for the
buyers not only among all matchings in S, but also among all s-competitive matchings.
In fact, if m' is not s-maximal then there is a s-competitive matching m such that ui ³ u'i
for all piÎP, with strict inequality holding for at least one buyer, where ' and u are the
payoff vectors of the buyers associated with (v, m') and (v,m), respectively. However, it
is necessarily the case that ui = u'i for all piÎPr-1, since all these players are maximizing
their utility payoff under m'. Hence mÎS, which contradicts the assumption that m' is
Pareto-efficient for the buyers.
We now prove that the property holds for r by contradiction. Suppose that there is
some P'ÍPr with q0ÏDi(v) for every piÎP', and such that ½P'½>½Èp
i
ÎP'Di(v)½. Let D º
Èp
i
ÎP'Di(v). It follows by the induction hypothesis that P'ËPr-1, so prÎP'. Also, applying
the induction hypothesis to P'-{pr}ÍPr-1, it is the case that ½P'½-1 = ½P'-{pr}½ £ ½D½
< ½P'½-1. Denoting P* º P'-{pr}, the previous inequalities imply that ½D½=½P*½ and
D = Èp
i
ÎP*Di(v). Moreover, since the matching m'ÎS (that we found previously) is
competitive for v in M' = (Pr-1, Q, a') and P*Í Pr-1, then m’(pi)ÎDi(v) for all piÎP*.
Thus, it is necessarily the case that D = m'(P*).
Now use Lemma 1 to obtain that there exists some piÎP* and qjÏD such that qjÎDi(v),
which is a contradiction.   Q.E.D.
Our first theorem asserts that the s-SPE outcomes are always competitive equilibria.
The insight obtained from Proposition 6 is very useful for both the understanding and
the proof of Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1- Let (v, m) be a s-SPE. Then, Hs(v, m) is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof- By Proposition 6, there is no overdemanded set of objects at the prices v.
Therefore, Proposition 5 guarantees that there is a matching m' which is a competitive
matching for v. Now observe that the buyers maximize their utility payoffs under m' and
m is s-maximal. Then v is a competitive price with matching m.
To prove that Hs(v, m) = (v*, m) is a competitive equilibrium, we have to show that v*
is a competitive price vector with matching m, where v*j = vj if qj is sold and v*j = 0
otherwise. Denote by u the payoff vector of the buyers associated to (v, m). Since there
are no m-expensive objects under v*, proving the theorem only requires us to show that
if qj is unsold and vj > v*j = 0, then ui ³ aij-v*j for all piÎP. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that there exists some unsold object, say qj, su h that vj > v*j = 0 and ui <
aij-v*j for some piÎP. There are some l > 0 and g > 0 such that ui+l = aij-g. Let v' be
such that v'j = g, and v'h = vh if qh ¹ qj. Since v is part of a s-SPE, it follows that qj is
unsold at any s-maximal matching for v'. However, maxh¹jaih-vh = ui < ui+l = aij-v'j,
hence buyer pi is not playing her best response at any s-maximal matching for v', which
is a contradiction. Therefore, Hs(v, m) is a competitive equilibrium.       Q E.D.
Theorem 1 ensures that only competitive equilibria are candidates for a s-SPE of the
mechanism. Theorem 2 goes a step further: Aside from the cases in which a seller has
an object unsold but sets an expensive price on his object, only the maximum
equilibrium prices can be part of a s-SPE of the mechanism Hs.
Theorem 2- Let (v, m) be a s-SPE. Then, Hs(v, m) = (v , m), where v  is the maximum
equilibrium price vector.
To prove the theorem, we will use the following lemma, whose proof is developed in
the Appendix.
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Lemma 2- Let (v1, m1) be a s-SPE and set Hs(v1, m1) º (v*, m1). Let (u2, v2, m2) be
some feasible outcome and Q+ = {qjÎQ ;  v2j > v*j}. If Q+ ¹ Æ, then there exists some
pair (pi, qh)ÎPxQ such that u2i+v2h < aih.
Proof of Theorem 2- Let Hs(v, m) = (v*, m). We have to show that v* ³ v' for all
equilibrium prices v'. Let v' be some equilibrium price vector, m' a competitive matching
for v', and u' the payoff vector of the buyers associated with (v', m'). Denote
Q+ = {qjÎQ ; m'(qj)ÎP and v'j > v*j}.
If Q+ ¹ Æ, then Lemma 2 asserts that there is some pair (pi, qh)ÎPxQ such that u'i+v'h <
aih, which is impossible since the price vector v' is ompetitive. Therefore Q+ = Æ. Since
there are no expensive objects at any equilibrium prices it follows that v* ³ v'. That is,
v* = v .       Q.E.D.
It easily follows from Theorem 2 that if (v, m) isa s-SPE and vj = 0 for all unmatched
seller qj, then v is the maximum equilibrium price vector. Of course, any prices v', with
v'j = vj if qj is matched under m, and v'j ³ vj if qj is unmatched under m, is also part of a s-
SPE leading to the maximum competitive equilibrium.
From Theorem 2 we know that Hs must necessarily lead to a maximum competitive
equilibrium. We now show that it is indeed the case that every maximum competitive
equilibrium is a s-SPE.
Theorem 3- Let (u, v ; m) be a seller-optimal stable outcome. Then, (v , m) is a s-SPE
for any s.
This theorem is proved with the help of Lemma 3. We include the proof of the lemma in
the Appendix.
Lemma 3- Let (u, v ) be the seller-optimal stable payoff. Let m be an optimal matching.
Construct a graph whose vertices are PÈQ and with two types of arcs. If m(pi) = qj
there is an arc from qj to pi; if qjÎDi(v ) and qj ¹ m(pi) there is an arc from pi to qj. Let
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pkÎP with uk > 0. Then, there exists an oriented path starting at pk nd ending at an
unsold object or at a buyer with a zero payoff.
Proof of Theorem 3- Consider any permutation s. The outcome of the strategies (v ,
m) is Hs(v , m) = (v ; m). Since m is competitive for v , it is the case that m is s-maximal
for v . Hence, to prove the theorem, it is sufficient to show that v  is indeed an
equilibrium for the sellers. Let qjÎQ-{q0}. We are going to show that qj will be unsold
at any s-maximal matching for v', where v'j > v j and v'h = v h if qh ¹ qj. However, before
we proceed to prove this property, we show that there is some competitive matching
for v , say m', which leaves qj unsold. The cases to be considered are the following:
Case 1. qj is unmatched at m. Then, take m' = m.
Case 2. m(qj) = pi and ui = 0. In this case, take m' so that m' agrees with m on the choices
of the buyers other than pi and associate pi to the null object.
Case 3. m(qj) = pi and ui > 0. By Lemma 3, there exists an oriented path c starting at pi
and ending at an unsold object qs or at a buyer ps with payoff zero. Since c does not
cycle then qj is not in c. Set c º (p = p1, q1, p2, q2,..., ps, qs) or c º (p = p1, q1, p2, q2,...,
ps, qs, ps+1). Now consider the matching m' that matches pt to qt, for all t = 1, 2,..., s, that
leaves ps+1 unmatched if ps+1 is on the path, that otherwise agrees with m with regard to
every object in Q-{qj} and every buyer in P that are not on the path, and that sets m'(qj)
= qj. Every buyer obtains the same utility under m' as under m, since m'(pt) = qtÎDt(v),
for all t = 1, 2,..., s and m' agrees with m for the other buyers. Therefore, m' is a
competitive matching for v .
In all of the three cases, we have found a matching m' for v  under which qj is not sold
and such that every buyer maximizes her utility payoff under v . Therefore, under m'
every buyer pk will be maximizing her utility payoff also for the price vector v', and she
obtains a utility of uk. Then, we claim that qj will be unsold at any s-maximal matching
for v': if qj was sold at the price v'j to some pk, we would have that akj-v'j < akj-v j £ uk,
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while the utility of the other buyers can not be higher than u, so the matching could not
be s-maximal.      Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 states that the only outcomes that can be reached through the mechanism
Hs are maximum competitive equilibria if we use equilibria in the strong sense. Theorem
3 asserts that any maximum equilibrium price vector is part of a -SPE. As a
consequence, the mechanism Hs implements in s-SPE the set of maximum competitive
equilibria.
Corollary 1- Let s be a permutation of the buyers. Then, Hs implements in s-SPE the
set of maximum competitive equilibria.
Proof- Immediate from theorems 2 and 3.
Since any s-SPE in the strong sense is a s-SPE in the weak sense we have:
Corollary 2- Let (u, v ; m) be a seller-optimal stable outcome. Then, (v , m) is a s-SPE
in the weak sense for any s.
5- DISCUSSION OF THE s-MAXIMAL STRATEGIES
In our analysis of the proposed selling procedure, we have assumed that buyers use
s-maximal strategies. An indifferent buyer picks an object that leads to an efficient
outcome for the buyers coming after her. This requires each buyer to know the
preferences of all the buyers that follow her in the line. There are some environments in
which this may be reasonable. However, there are also other situations in which this
hypothesis is demanding and, in those environments, one may argue that the mechanism
is not very practical.
How can buyers chose a -maximal strategy in those cases where the information
about the others' preferences is not complete? Are there reasonable ways through which
the buyers can actually follow s-maximal strategies if, a priori, they do not know each
other preferences? We claim that such reasonable ways exist.
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It is often the case that when buyers are in a queue, they chat about their respective
choices. The buyers that are not well placed in the line may try to make their
preferences clear so that the buyers ahead in the queue solve indifferences in their favor.
This can be seen as an informal way of transmitting information. If the number of buyers
is large and there is no possibility for mutual knowledge or communication among
buyers, the informal channel may be difficult to implement. In this case, we would need
an external referee that would ask for the buyers' preferences and, once the buyers
reveal them, chooses a s-maximal matching taking into account the reports by the
buyers and the predetermined order s.
The two previous mechanisms, the informal and the formal one, are quite similar. For
simplicity, let us consider the formal mechanism in which a referee is called in to
arbitrate. The mechanism is a useful way to transmit information only if buyers do have
incentives to declare their preferences truthfully. A simple and easy test about the
strategic incentives to lie is to check whether truth-t lling is a max-min strategy.
Following a max-min strategy, a buyer maximizes the minimum level of utility she can
guarantee for herself independently of the others' preferences. Indeed, in the previous
mechanism, truth-telling is a max-min strategy. The reason is that, by telling the truth,
the i-th buyer obtains, at least, her i-th most preferred object, and this is the most she
can guarantee for herself.7 If a buyer does not have any information about the others’
preferences, following a max-min strategy is "safe". Therefore, truth-telling is a
reasonable strategy.
There is also a less demanding approach to the problem of the transmission of
information among buyers that allows obtaining our implementation result. We are
going to develop this approach in some detail. We propose a mechanism in which a
buyer is not asked to reveal her preferences, as in the previous proposal, but she only
has to reveal her indifferences to the following buyer in the line. Informally, once the
                                         
7 Truth telling is not the only max-min strategy. Every strategy in which thei-th buyer keeps the
same set of the i most preferred objects but changes the order of these objects is also a max-min
strategy.
22
first buyer realizes that she is indifferent among a certain set of objects, she says so to
the second buyer. The second buyer can also tell the third buyer about the different
paths (that is, the different matchings for buyers 1 and 2) among which she is
indifferent, respecting the will of the first buyer, and so on. We will refer to this
mechanism as mechanism R. In the rest of the section, we will first formally define the
mechanism R and will show that buyers do not have any incentives to lie when they play
it. Then, we will characterize the set of matchings that can be expected to be formed
following the mechanism R. Finally, we will extend the implementation result to the
framework in which buyers form such matchings.
We describe the m chanism R. It is played once the sellers have posted the vector of
prices v. For notational simplicity, we consider s = (p1,..., pm).
(1) At t = 1, buyer p1 chooses a non-empty subset S1 of the set of feasible matchings for
M1 º ({p1}, Q, a). For p1, choosing a set S1 is equivalent to choosing a subset of Q.
(2) At t = 2, buyer p2 chooses a non-empty subset S2 of the set of feasible matchings for
M2 º ({p1, p2}, Q, a) whose restriction to M1 is an element of S1. For p2, choosing a set
S2 amounts to telling to p1 the object(s) p2 wants p1 to pick up among the “objects” in S1
and then, for each of those objects, choosing one or more objects for herself.
(t) At t, for 2 < t £ m, buyer pt chooses a non-empty subset St of he set of feasible
matchings for Mt º ({p1,..., pt}, Q, a) whose restriction to Mt-1 is an element of St-1.
That is, at t, the elements of St are matchings for buyer pt and for the buyers previous to
her. Buyer pt has, however, to respect the will of the previous buyers, expressed in St-1.
After all buyers have played, we have a final set Sm. The matching that will actually
take place will be chosen at random among the matchings in Sm.
Proposition 7- In the mechanism R, the following is a SPE for a vector of prices v:
given a set St-1, buyer pt reports a set St that consists in her most preferred matchings
(given the price vector v) among the matchings whose restriction to Mt-1 is in St-1.
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Proof- When pt chooses St, she knows that she will be buying according to one of the
paths in St, independently on the choices of the buyers coming after her. A buyer does
not have any incentives to lie at all and truth-telling is a best response to every possible
set St-1. Hence, truth-telling is a SPE.  Q. .D.
The important fact about the proposed strategy (truth-telling) is that a buyer does
not need to know the other buyers' preferences. The set of possible outcomes of a buyer
does depend on the previous buyers' preferences, but her strategy is independent on
them. On the other hand, the preferences of the buyers coming after her do not have any
influence on the choice of a buyer. This is the case because, following the strategy,
buyer pt is indifferent between the objects that the matchings in St ass gn to her.
We now show that, when the buyers declare their true indifferences, that is, when
they follow the proposed SPE, then they end up forming a s-max mal matching. In fact,
they always form a particular type of matching; we will call them top ma chings. A top
matching is a s-maximal matching that is one of the most preferred by the buyers when
they can choose according to s. That is, a top matching is one of the most preferred s-
maximal matchings for the second buyer; it is one of the most preferred for the third
buyer among the s-maximal matchings most preferred by the second buyer; and so on.
More formally:
Definition 13- A feasible matching m for M is a top matching if it is s-maximal and, for
any other s-maximal matching m' such that u'i > ui for some buyer pi, there exists a
buyer pk, with k < i, such that uk > u'k, where u and u' are the payoff vectors of the
buyers associated to (v, m) and (v, m') respectively.
Proposition 8- If buyers declare truthfully their indifferences in the mechanism R (that
is, they use the SPE strategies proposed in Proposition 7), then Sm is the set of top
matchings.
Proof- Take m Î Sm. Given that buyers choose their best matchings, m is s-competitive
for v. We prove that m is s-maximal and that it is a top matching if we show that, for
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any other s-competitive matching m' for v such that u'i > ui for some buyer pi, there
exists a buyer pk, with k < i, such that uk > u'k, where u and u' are the payoff vectors of
the buyers associated to (v, m) and (v, m') respectively. We make the proof by
contradiction. Suppose that there is a s-competitive matching m' for v such that u'i > ui
for some buyer pi and uk = u'k for every k < i. (Note that u1 = u’1, since m and m' are both
s-competitive matchings.) Since m andm' provide the same utility to buyers p1,..., pi-1, it
is easy to see that the restriction of m to Mk is in Sk if and only if the restriction of m' t
Mk is in Sk, for every k < i. Since m Î Sm, it is the case that the restriction of m to Mi-1 is
in Si-1. Therefore, the restriction of m' t  Mi-1 is also in Si-1. But then, buyer pi is not
maximizing her utility by choosing a set Si that includes the restriction of m to Mi: she
would obtain a higher utility by taking S'i = {restriction of m' to Mi}. Hence Sm is
contained in the set of top matchings.
It remains to show that every top matching is in Sm. Note first that Sm is non-empty by
construction. Take m in Sm and let m’ be any other top matching. Then both matching
are also s-maximal. Let u and u’ be the payoff vectors of the buyers associated to (v, m)
and (v, m'), respectively. By Definition 13 we must have that u1 = u’1. Now apply the
definition of a top matching to both matchings to get that ui = u’i for ll i = 1,…, m.
Finally, given that every player is indifferent between m and m’, then the restriction of m
to Mk is in Sk if and only if the restriction of m' toMk is in Sk. Therefore, m’ Î Sm.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 8 tells us what matchings can be expected if each buyer follows the
equilibrium strategy of declaring truthfully her indifferences to the next buyer in the line.
On the one hand, only s-maximal matchings are expected. On the other hand, only a
subset of the set of s-maximal matchings (the top matchings) will be formed. This can
be problematic because, to prove the implementation result in theorems 2 and 3, we
have assumed that buyers can use any s-maximal strategy. What happens if we assume
that buyers choose top strategies (strategies leading to top matchings) with certainty?
(For example, because they use the proposed communication channel to break
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indifferences in favor of the buyers after them in the line.) Next theorem shows that, in
this framework, the implementation result still holds.
Theorem 4- Let s be a permutation of the buyers. Then, the set of SPE in the strong
sense of the mechanism Hs coincides with the set of maximum competitive equilibria
when the buyers use top strategies.
The main message of Theorem 4 (whose proof is relegated to the Appendix) is that it
is possible to relax the hypothesis of perfect information among buyers and still obtain
the implementation result. If buyers do not know each other preferences, they can set
up a simple channel to transmit the relevant information (their indifferences). Theorem 4
shows that when the buyers use such a channel, the final prices are still the maximum
competitive prices and the final matching is optimal.
6- SOME ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES
In order to obtain our results, we have restricted the analysis to what we have called
maximal strategies by the buyers (or top strategies, in Section 5), and to equilibria in the
strong sense by the sellers. We show here, through examples, that without such
restrictions the implementation result (Corollary 1) no longer holds. In this section, the
notation s-SPE* stands for subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in general,
without restricting attention to equilibria in the strong sense and/or allowing any
strategy by the buyers.
The first question is what happens if we still restrict attention to s-SPE* i he
strong sense, while allowing the buyers to use any s-competitive strategies. Note that
this change diminishes the set of equilibria since the optimistic seller looking for a
deviation considers as possible a larger set of buyers' strategies. Example 3 shows that
the set of equilibria may be empty for all s. In the example, we will use the following
result, whose proof is relegated to an Appendix.
Proposition 9- If (v, m) is a s-SPE* in the strong sense then Hs(v, m) is a competitive
equilibrium. Consequently m is a s-maximal matching for v.
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Example 3- (The set of s-SPNE* may be empty for all s) Consider a set of objects
Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3} and a set of buyers P = {p1, p2, p3}. Let a be such that a11 = a33 = 5,
a12 = a32 = 1, a13 = a21 = a23 = a31 = 4 and a22 = 0. There is only one stable payoff in
this market: u = (1, 0, 1) and v = (0, 4, 0, 4). There are four optimal matchings, denoted
mk, k = 1, 2, 3, 4: m1(p1) = q1, m1(p2) = q2, m1(p3) = q3; m2(p1) = q1, m2(p2) = q3, m2(p3) =
q2; m3(p1) = q2, m3(p2) = q1, m3(p3) = q3; and m4(p1) = q1, m4(p2) = q0, m4(p3) = q3. Then,
by Proposition 7, (v mk), k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the only candidates for  s-SPE* in the
strong sense, for any s. However, we show now that none of them are s-SPE*s in the
strong sense for any s.
Consider first  = (p1, p2, p3) or s = (p2, p3, p1). The strategies (v, mi) do not
constitute a s-SPE* in the strong sense because the deviation v'2 = 0.5 followed by the
s-competitive matching m2 for the first ordering and by m3 for the second one is
profitable to seller q2. Second, if s = (p3, p1, p2) or s = (p3, p2, p1), then if seller q1
deviates with v'1 = 4.5, the m2 is also a best response for the buyers. Thus the deviation
v'1 is profitable to q1. Finally, if s = (p2, p1, p3) or s = (p1, p3, p2), then the deviation v'3
= 4.5 is profitable to q3 if the buyers use the s-competitive strategy m3. Also in these
cases (v, mi) is not a s-SPE* in the strong sense. Note that m2 or m3 are not s-maximal
matchings for v' in none of the cases (this is only a confirmation of Theorem 3)
The second question is whether restricting attention to equilibria in the strong sense
is actually a restriction (note that the set of equilibria is a superset of the set of equilibria
in the strong sense). When buyers only use maximal strategies, Example 4 shows that it
is indeed the case that there exist equilibria different from the maximum competitive
equilibria.
Example 4- Consider a set of objects Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4}, a set of buyers P = {p1,
p2, p3, p4}, and s = (p1, p2, p3, p4). Let a14 = a23 = a31 = a34 = a42 = a43 = 0 and let the
other entries be equal to 2. The maximum price vector is v = (0, 2, 2, 2, 2) and an
optimal matching is m: m(p1) = q1, m(p2) = q2, m(p3) = q3, m(p4) = q4. However, we claim
that v = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) followed by the s-maximal matching m is part of a s-SPE* (in the
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weak sense) in which the out-of-equilibrium s-maximal strategies for the buyers are the
following:
(a) If v'1 > v1 and v'i = vi, for i = 2, 3, 4, then m1(p1) = q3, m1(p2) = q2, m1(p3) = q0, m1(p4) =
q4.
(b) If v'2 > v2 and v'i = vi, for i = 1, 3, 4, then m2(p1) = q1, m2(p2) = q4, m2(p3) = q3, m2(p4) =
q0.
(c) If v'3 > v3 and v'i = vi, for i = 1, 2, 4, then m3(p1) = q1, m3(p2) = q4, m3(p3) = q2, m3(p4) =
q0.
(d) If v'4 > v4 and v'i = vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, then m4(p1) = q3, m4(p2) = q2, m4(p3) = q0, m4(p4) =
q1.
To check that the strategies are s-m ximal, take for example case (a). If m1 is not s-
maximal, then it is necessarily the case that m'(p3)Î{q1, q2, q3}, for any m' Pareto-
superior for the buyers to m1. But in this case either p1, or p2, or p4 are strictly worse-off
with m' than with m1, so m' is not Pareto-superior to m1.
We may also find competitive equilibria that are not  s-SPE*.
Example 5- Consider Q = {q1}, P = {p1, p2} and s = (p1, p2). Let a be such that a11
= 8 and a21 = 7. The competitive equilibrium (v = 7, m), where m(p1) = q1, is not a s-
SPE* for any s. In fact, the deviation v'1 = 7.5 is surely profitable to q1.
Our final question is what ppens if we look for s-SPE* without restricting
attention either to maximal strategies or to equilibria in the strong sense. The following
example shows that the s-SPE* are not necessarily competitive equilibria.
Example 6- Consider Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4}, P = {p1, p2, p3} and s = (p1, p2, p3).
Let a be such that a11 = a22 = 5, a13 = a24 = 3, a31 = a32 = 7, and the other entries are
equal to zero. The price vector v = (0,2, 2, 0, 0) with the matching m(p1) =q1, m(p2) =
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q2, m(p3) = q0, is not a competitive equilibrium. However, we claim that they constitute
a s-SPE* with the following out-of-equilibrium continuation:
(a) If v'1 > v1 and v'i = vi, for i = 2, 3, 4, then m1(p1) = q3, m1(p2) = q4, m1(p3) = q2.
(b) If v'2 > v2 and v'i = vi, for i = 1, 3, 4, then m2(p1) = q3, m2(p2) = q4, m2(p3) = q1.
(e) If v' different from the previous (a)-(b), then take any s-competitive strategy.
7- CONCLUSION
In our opinion, the analysis developed in this paper shows that a mechanism in which
both buyers and sellers use very simple strategies can work well. The mechanism is
meant to reflect the working of some markets. Each seller posts the price for his object,
price that will become final if the object is sold. Each buyer chooses an object (if any) to
buy, the choices by the buyers directly producing the final matching in the market. We
have shown that, when buyers use maximal strategies, the strategies played by buyers
and sellers at any subgame perfect equilibria in the strong sense lead to the maximum
equilibrium price vector and to an optimal matching. Therefore, the partnerships formed
between buyers and sellers are efficient and the actual prices constitute a competitive
equilibrium in this market (the competitive equilibrium most preferred by the sellers).
Moreover, in equilibrium, the order in which the buyers are in the line is not relevant:
the set of equilibria is independent of the line (the permutation s) and the utility that
each buyer and seller obtain at any equilibrium is the same.
In the mechanism that we propose, the sellers post prices first and the actual
matching is then chosen by the buyers sequentially. This timing seems the most natural
one. On the one hand, if we interchange the roles so that buyers propose prices and
sellers choose the matching, the buyers' strategies are more complex: since objects are
different from the buyers' perspective, each buyer needs to set a vector of prices, instead
of just one price. This makes the mechanism less attractive and the analysis more
difficult. Note, however, that the result seems very sensitive to the side of the market
that moves first. The ability of fixing the prices causes that the equilibrium prices are the
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highest among the possible competitive prices. On the other hand, one can also think of
a mechanism in which the buyers choose simultaneously their preferred objects once the
sellers have simultaneously proposed prices. This is in the spirit of the mechanisms
analyzed in Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998) and Alcalde and
Romero-Medina (1999). However, in contrast with the previous papers, the
implementation of the mechanism in the assignment games brings about the problem of
deciding what happens if two different buyers choose the same object. The sequentiality
of our mechanism allows us to avoid the use of tie-breaking rules, as well as the strong
implicit coordination needed for the equilibria of simultaneous mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1- Suppose, by way of contradiction, that for all piÎP’ and all qjÏQ’
we have that qjÏDi(v). That is, suppose that Q’ º m(P’) = Èp
i
ÎP’Di(v). Since ui > 0 for
all piÎP’, it implies that q0ÏQ’ and so
 |P’| = |Q’|. (1)
Let pk be the last buyer in P’ under s and qh = m(pk) be the object that pk buys. From
Dk(v)ÍQ’ it follows that uk > akj-vj for all qjÏQ’. Now use that uk > 0 to get that there
exists some l > 0 such that 
                 uk-l > akj-vj  for all  qjÏQ’, and (2)
uk-l > 0. (3)
Let v’ be such that v’h = vh+l, v’j = vj for all qj ¹ qh. Since pk is the last buyer in P’
under s, it follows that pk will buy qh at the price v’h if the previous buyers keep buying
according to m. This is immediate from (1) and (2). Indeed, equation (1) implies that qh
is the unique available object belonging to Q’ when pk is called to play; equation (2)
implies that {qh} = Dk(v’|Qk). Hence m is s-competitive for v’.
We will show that m is s-maximal for v’, which will contradict the initial hypothesis
that v is part of a s-SPE. Again, we do the proof by contradiction. Suppose that m is
not s-maximal for v’. Then, there is some matching m’ which is -competitive for v’
and such that:
u’i ³ ui for all  piÎP-{pk}  and u’k ³ uk-l, (4)
 with at least one strict inequality, where u’ is the payoff vector for the buyers
associated to (v’, m’). From (4) and (2) it follows that
                                        u’k > akj-vj  for all  qjÏQ’. (5)
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However, using the hypothesis that m(pi)ÎDi(v) for all piÎP’ and (4), it follows that for
all piÎP’-{pk}, u’i = ui (u’i > ui is not possible because pi is maximizing her payoff
under m). Consequently m’(pi)ÎDi(v) for all piÎP’-{pk}, and so m’(pi)ÎQ’ for all
piÎP’-{pk}. Also if pi ¹ pk then m’(pi) ¹ qh, for if not aih-vh > aih-vh-l = u’i = ui ³
aih-vh, which is a contradiction. Therefore
m’(pi)ÎQ’-{qh}  for all  piÎP’-{pk}. (6)
 By (3) and (4), we obtain that u’k > 0, so pk is matched under m’. That m’(pk)ÎQ’
follows from (5). Now use (1) and (6) to get that m’(pk) = qh.
Since l can be taken arbitrarily small, it is then easily seen that if m’ is s-competitive
for v’ then m’ is also s-competitive for v. Moreover, u’i ³ ui for all piÎP and u’i > ui for
some piÎP (piÎP-P’), which contradicts the s-maximality of m for v. Hence, m is s-
maximal for v’. Therefore, there is a profitable deviation from v, which is a
contradiction. Then, there exists some piÎP’ and qjÏQ’ such that qjÎDi(v).Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2- Case 1. m1(Q+) ¹ m2(Q+). Since every seller in Q+ is matched by m2,
choose piÎm2(Q+)-m1(Q+), say pi = m2(qj). Denote by u1 the payoff vector of the buyers
associated with (v1,m1). By Theorem 1, (u1, v*; m1) is stable. It then follows that 0 £ u2i
< u1i, since otherwise aij = u2i+v2j > u1i+v*j, which would contradict the stability of
(u1,v*,m1). This implies that pi is necessarily matched under m1, say pi = m1(qh), where
qhÏQ+ (i.e., v*h ³ v2h). Then, aih = u1i+v*h > u2i+v2h, which proves the lemma.
Case 2. m2(Q+) = m1(Q+). Consider any piÎm2(Q+) = m1(Q+) and denote qj = m1(pi)ÎQ+
and qk = m2(pi)ÎQ+. First, u1i = aij- v*j ³ aik- v*k since (u1,v*;m1) is stable by Theorem
1. Second, v*k < v2k because qkÎQ+. Then u1i > aik- v2k = u2i ³ 0. Therefore u1i >u2i ³ 0
for all piÎm2(Q+). Moreover, stability implies that m1(pi)ÎDi(v1) for all piÎP. By Lemma
1, making Q' º Q+ and P' º m1(Q+), there exists some piÎm1(Q+) and qhÏQ+ such that
qhÎDi(v1). Hence aih = u1i+v*h > u2i+v*h ³ u2i+v2h, where the last inequality comes from
qhÏQ+, and the result follows.       Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3- Suppose that there is no such a path and denote by S and T the sets
of objects and buyers, respectively, that can be reached from pk. T n ui > 0 for all piÎT
and each object in S is sold to some buyer in T. Furthermore, if qÏS, then there is no
buyer in T who demands qj at prices v . In this case, it is possible to decrease ui for allpi
in T by some l > 0 and increase v j for all qjÎSÈ{m(pk)} by the same l > 0 and still
have a stable outcome, which contradicts the maximality of v .     Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4- Lemma 1 still holds if we replace the following sentence in its
statement: “Let m be some s-maximal matching for v…” with: “Let m be some top
matching for v…” For the proof, see that m is also a top matching for v’, since every
buyer pt is matched under m to some object in Di(v). For the proof of Proposition 6,
apply the mechanism R and obtain any top matching (instead of simply a s-maxim l
matching) whose restriction to M’ = (Pr-1, Q, a) is a competitive matching for v in M’.
This is possible because Proposition 5 implies that there exists some competitive
matching for v in M’, so every buyer in {p1,…, pr-1} is maximizing her payoff under this
matching. Now, apply Lemma 1 and get the desired result.
Since Proposition 6 holds, Theorem 1 also holds in this framework. Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1 are used in the proof of Lemma 2, which is needed in the proof of Theorem
2. Lemma 3 does not change. For the proof of Theorem 3 observe that m is a top
matching for v  and keep the rest of the proof unchanged. Therefore, Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 still hold in this new set-up.   Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9- Remember that (v, m) is a s-SPE* in the strong sense if for no
qj there is a v', with v'h = vh for qh ¹ qj, and a s-competitive matching m' for v', such that
Hsj(v', m') > Hsj(v, m). Let Hs(v, m) = (v*, m). Suppose by way of contradiction that (v*,
m) is not a competitive equilibrium. Let u be the payoff vector of the buyers associated
to (v*, m). Then there is a pair (pi, qj) such that ui+v*j < aij. Either (a) qj is a m-
expensive object for v (qj is unsold and vj > v*j = 0), or (b) qj was sold at price v*j = vj
with s(m(qj)) < s(pi). In this case, choose qj o that
if ui+v'h < aih then s(m(qh)) < s(m(qj)). (7)
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Let l > 0 and g > 0 be such that (ui+l)+(v*j+g) = aij and let v' be such that v'j = v*j+g
and v'h = vh for all qh ¹ qj. Then aij-v'j =  ui+l > ui ³ aih-v*h, so
aij-v'j >aih-v*h for all qhÎQi  (8)
where Qi is the set of available objects for pi under m. In case (a) let every buyer pk, with
s(pk) < s(pi), choose m(pk), which is still a best response for pk to v'. Thus the set of
available objects for pi under v' is still Qi. Hence, by (8), qj will be the only object in the
demand set of pi at prices v'. Therefore qj will be sold to pi. In this case seller qj wins by
deviating, which contradicts the fact that (v, m) is a s-SPE*.
Consider now case (b). Let every buyer pk with s(pk) < s(m(qj)) play m(pk), which is still
a best response for pk to v'. Then at the time pi is called to play, if qj is still available, no
matter which were the choice of m(qj) and the choices of the buyers who came after
m(qj), qj will be the pi’s most preferred object in her set of available objects. In fact, if
aih-v'h > aij-v'j =ui+l > ui then ui+v’h< aih, so s(m(qh)) < s(m(qj)) by (7). By hypothesis
this implies that m(qh) buys qh at v', so qh is not available to pi when she comes to play.
Now use (2) to get that pi will buy qj at v'j. Therefore, in any case, v'j is a profitable
deviation. Hence (v, m) is a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, as a consequence of this
result, m is an optimal matching so it is a s-maximal matching for v and the proof is
complete.    Q.E.D.
